Since 2019, I have been a Postdoctoral Fellow at Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique. My research, which was funded successively by the Centre and by the Swiss National Science Foundation, focuses on the notion of speciesism. More specifically, I argue that the speciesist belief that humans count more than other animals is epistemically defective because it is shaped by two irrelevant influences: tribalism and cognitive dissonance.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm with another SNSF fellowship. In the project "Normative Issues in Metaethics," I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Within the project "Beyond Sacrificial Dilemmas: Broadening the Psychology of Consequentialism," Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty non-sacrificial thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments typically follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm with another SNSF fellowship. In the project "Normative Issues in Metaethics," I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Within the project "Beyond Sacrificial Dilemmas: Broadening the Psychology of Consequentialism," Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty non-sacrificial thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments typically follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.