Since September 2021, I have been an Assistant Professor and the adjunct head of the Master's degree in Ethics at the Université de Strasbourg. Since October 2022, I have been a statutory member of the Archives Henri Poincaré - Philosophie et Recherches sur les Sciences et les Technologies. My research interests include animal ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics.
From 2019 to August 2021, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique. My research there focused on the notion of speciesism. More specifically, I argued that the belief that humans count more than other animals is epistemically defective because it is shaped by two irrelevant influences: tribalism and cognitive dissonance.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm, where I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. As part of this project, I addressed such question as: Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.
From 2019 to August 2021, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique. My research there focused on the notion of speciesism. More specifically, I argued that the belief that humans count more than other animals is epistemically defective because it is shaped by two irrelevant influences: tribalism and cognitive dissonance.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm, where I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. As part of this project, I addressed such question as: Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.