I am an Assistant Professor and the adjunct head of the Master's degree in Ethics at the Université de Strasbourg. My research interests include metaethics, normative ethics, and animal ethics.
From 2019 to August 2021, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique. My research focused on the notion of speciesism. More specifically, I argued that the belief that humans count more than other animals is epistemically defective because it is shaped by two irrelevant influences: tribalism and cognitive dissonance.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm, where I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty non-sacrificial thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.
From 2019 to August 2021, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique. My research focused on the notion of speciesism. More specifically, I argued that the belief that humans count more than other animals is epistemically defective because it is shaped by two irrelevant influences: tribalism and cognitive dissonance.
In 2017-2019, I was a Visiting Postdoc at the universities of Birmingham and Stockholm, where I investigated the normative implications of the moral error theory. Is there anything we should do if all moral claims were false? And, if so, what is it?
In 2016-2017, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Université de Genève's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. Florian Cova and I designed and used a bank of sixty non-sacrificial thought experiments to test Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which utilitarian judgments typically result from rational episodes whereas deontological judgments follow emotional reactions.
In 2016, I received a PhD from the Université de Genève for a thesis entitled "Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist." In this work, which was supervised by Prof. Julien Deonna, I argued that moral error theorists have decisive prudential reasons to adopt a utilitarian moral fiction.