Monographs
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1. Jaquet, F. & Amselek, M. (2025). Faut-il être végane? Éthique d'un mode de vie. Éditions Sciences humaines, (Reviewed here.)
   Quoi qu’il demeure le fait d’une minorité, en à peine une décennie, le véganisme est devenu un authentique sujet de société, un thème clivant qui ne laisse personne, ou presque, indifférent. Si la question de sa moralité a fait l’objet de développements majeurs dans la littérature scientifique internationale, en France, seuls quelques livres lui sont consacrés, dont plus ou moins aucun ne relève de l’éthique. Faut-il être végane ? vise à combler cette lacune. François Jaquet et Malou Amselek s’attachent en premier lieu à fournir une définition du véganisme, qu’ils conçoivent comme le mode de vie excluant la production, l’achat et l’utilisation de biens d’origine animale. Ils soumettent ensuite à un examen critique les arguments le plus souvent mobilisés en faveur et à l’encontre de ces trois pratiques. Rédigé dans un style sans verbiage, l’ouvrage se distingue par sa clarté et la rigueur de son argumentation. Il offre une introduction incontournable au débat contemporain sur l’éthique du véganisme.
   
   
2. Jaquet, F. (2024). Le pire des maux: Éthique et ontologie du spécisme. Eliott Éditions. (Reviewed here, here, here, and there.)​
   Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ?
   
   
3. Jaquet, F. & Naar, H. (2024). ​Qui peut sauver la morale? Essai de métaéthique (2nd edition). Eliott Éditions.​ 
   Vous pensez peut-être que la peine de mort est injuste ou que l'avortement est moralement acceptable? Se pourrait-il que vous vous trompiez? C'est en tout cas l'avis des théoriciens de l'erreur. D'après ces philosophes, tous les jugements moraux sont faux parce qu'ils présupposent à tort l'existence de faits moraux objectifs et non naturels. Face à ce défi nihiliste, le présent ouvrage présente et interroge les principales approches métaéthiques comme autant de tentatives, plus ou moins fructueuses, de sauver la morale. Les théories examinées combinent invariablement une thèse psychologique (sur la nature des jugements moraux) et une thèse ontologique (sur l'existence d'une réalité morale conforme auxdits présupposés). Bien que destinée en premier lieu aux enseignants de philosophie ainsi qu'à leurs étudiants, cette introduction à la métaéthique se veut accessible à tous ceux qu'intéresse la philosophie morale.
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4. Jaquet, F. & Naar, H. (2019). ​Qui peut sauver la morale? Essai de métaéthique (1st edition). Ithaque.​ (Reviewed here, here, here, here, and there.)​ ​

Articles in peer-reviewed journals
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1. Jaquet, F. (forthcoming). "Réponse à mes critiques" (in a symposium dedicated to Le pire des maux. Éthique et ontologie du spécisme), Dialogue.
   Cet article discute trois critiques de mon ouvrage Le pire des maux. Éthique et ontologie du spécisme. Face à Sarah Zanaz, je clarifie la distinction entre définir et décrire et rejette les définitions systémiques du spécisme. Je défends ensuite mes conceptions du capacitisme et du spécisme contre une objection élaborée par Virginie Simoneau-Gilbert. Enfin, je réponds à Nicolas Delon, qui s’en prend successivement à ma définition du spécisme et à mon affirmation que le spécisme existe.
   
   
2. Jaquet, F. (2025). "Is Racism Wrong by Definition?", Philosophia. (Open access)
   The present paper challenges a dogma in the philosophy of race, according to which racism is not only wrong but wrong by definition. After distinguishing this view from three claims in the vicinity, I discuss three arguments for it and find them wanting. Then I put forward two arguments against it. The view that racism is unjustified as a matter of definition can accommodate neither the existence of conceptually competent proud racists nor the possibility of racism in a world without values. That racism is wrong is a substantive moral fact, not a conceptual truth.
   
   
3. Jaquet, F. (2025). "Some Concerns about Richard Joyce’s Morality", International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 15(4), 282-306. (Open access)
   In Morality: From Error to Fiction, Richard Joyce builds a case against the existence of moral facts that consists of three independent arguments. In my assessment, these arguments are unpersuasive. The argument from naturalism presupposes that the world contains only physical facts. I present several reasons to reject such a restriction. The argument from unreliability rests on the claim that moral intuitions are untrustworthy and thus cannot justify moral beliefs. Joyce’s reasons to that effect do not hold up to critical scrutiny. The argument from responsibility states that moral facts do not exist because they necessitate moral responsibility, which is nowhere to be found. I question both premises, arguing that some moral facts do not necessitate moral responsibility and that some form of moral responsibility exists. Overall, while Joyce’s arguments are not entirely bad, I think they are not good enough to make a powerful case for error theory.
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4. Jaquet, F. (2025). "How to Define Speciesism", Journal of Ethics, 29, 477–496. (Open access)
   In the animal ethics literature, speciesism is defined in all sorts of manners. It is construed as a behaviour or a philosophical view, as necessarily anthropocentric or possibly centred on other species, as involving the idea that species membership is morally significant or compatible with the rejection of that idea, as necessarily immoral or possibly ethically acceptable. Up to a point, this variety is unobjectionable. We are at liberty to stipulate the sense in which we use words. But this is true only within limits. Some definitions are good and some bad, depending on whether or not they meet certain conditions. In this contribution, I define speciesism as unequal treatment based on species and argue that this definition fares better than extant accounts insofar as it satisfies two desiderata: matching a good account of racism and making the concept of speciesism most useful.
   
   
5. Jaquet, F. (2025). "Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 29(3), 333-354.
   To date, much of the speciesism debate has centered on an ethical question: Can speciesism be justified, or is it immoral, as the analogy with racism suggests? Another question has received less attention: How prevalent is speciesism? Animal ethicists have largely assumed that speciesism is pervasive in our societies. After all, almost everyone routinely treats animals in ways they would never treat fellow humans. This widespread assumption is now being challenged. Some philosophers are beginning to question whether speciesism is an accurate diagnosis for our conduct. This paper defends the orthodox view against such critiques. It refutes three challenges to the existence of speciesism—one posed by Travis Timmerman, another by Shelly Kagan, and a third inspired by Stijn Bruers. Some of these arguments rely on a flawed understanding of speciesism; all generate implausible empirical predictions.
   
   
6. Jaquet, F. (2024). "Indirect Defenses of Speciesism Make No Sense", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 105(3), 308-327.​
   Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature.
   
   
7. Jaquet, F. (2023). "Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 24(1), 102-118.
   According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections”, according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.
   
   
8. Jaquet, F. (2022). "Speciesism and Tribalism: Embarrassing Origins", Philosophical Studies, 179(3), 933-954. (Open access)
   Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable.
   
   
9. Jaquet, F. (2022). “What's Wrong with Speciesism”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 56, 395–408. (Open access)
   The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the second. In response, Singer has grasped the first horn of this dilemma and tried to accommodate Kagan’s apparent counterexamples. In my opinion, this attempt is unpersuasive: the principle of equal consideration is inconsistent with common-sense intuitions on Kagan’s cases. Worse, Singer’s argument begs the question anyway. It therefore faces two serious objections. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with speciesism, however. In the second half of the paper, I propose another, better argument against speciesism, which I argue is immune to both objections. According to this other argument, speciesism is wrong because it involves discriminating on the basis of a merely biological property.
   
   
10. Jaquet, F., Gouiran, M, & Cova, F. (2022). "Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal origins of the opposition between utilitarian and deontological judgments and the psychological underpinnings of people’s beliefs about the moral status of animals. One issue that remains underexplored in this research area is the relationship between people’s disposition to engage in utilitarian thinking and their attitudes towards animals. This gap is unfortunate considering the tight philosophical connection between utilitarianism and the claim that animals have the same moral status as humans. Indeed, the principle of utility leads naturally enough to the view that animals count every bit as much as human beings. In this paper, we report two empirical studies dedicated to bridging this gap. In Study 1, we looked at the relationship between attitudes towards animals and utilitarian judgments in the context of sacrificial dilemmas. In Study 2, we bypassed the problems raised by the use of such dilemmas as a measure of utilitarianism by relying on other types of thought experiments. Overall, our results suggest no strong correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals. Rather, the existence of a correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals very much depends on how both are measured.
    
    
11. Jaquet, F. (2021). “A Debunking Argument Against Speciesism”, Synthese, 198, 1011-1027. (Open access)
    Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this “speciesist belief” plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My contention is that this belief is unjustified because it is largely due to an off-track process: our attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the “meat paradox”. Most meat-eaters believe that it is wrong to harm animals unnecessarily, yet they routinely and deliberately behave in ways that cause great unnecessary suffering to animals. As recent research suggests, this practical inconsistency puts them in an unpleasant state of dissonance, which they try to escape by resolving the paradox. And they do so in part by adopting the speciesist belief—if animal suffering matters much less than human suffering, then harming animals cannot be so wrong after all. Since this belief-forming process does not track moral truth, I conclude that we are not justified in believing that human interests matter more than the similar interests of non-humans.
    
    
12. Jaquet, F. (2021). “Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist”, Journal of Ethics, 25, 39-55. (Open access)
    The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called “now-what problem”: if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace our moral beliefs with fictional attitudes, beliefs in natural facts, or conative attitudes. But all these philosophers have set aside an important question about the content of these attitudes: which moral propositions, and more generally which moral theory, should we accept? The present paper addresses this neglected issue, arguing that moral error theorists should adopt a utilitarian moral fiction. In other words, they should accept the set of moral principles whose general acceptance would maximize overall well-being.
    
    
13. Jaquet, F. & Cova, F. (2021). “Beyond Moral Dilemmas: The Role of Reasoning in Five Categories of Utilitarian Judgment”, Cognition, 209 (retracted).
    Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene’s dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance.
    
    
14. Jaquet, F. (2020). “Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 17(3), 239-258.
    Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism (we should replace our moral judgments with conative attitudes), naturalism (we should replace our moral judgments with beliefs in non-moral facts), and fictionalism (we should replace our moral judgments with fictional attitudes). In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists cannot consistently subscribe. This leaves us with only one revisionary solution to the now-what problem.
    
    
15. Jaquet, F. (2019). “Is Speciesism Wrong by Definition?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 32(3), 447-458. (Open access)
    Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of “speciesism” that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of “murder” that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive (Is speciesism wrong by definition?) and the other normative (Should speciesism be wrong by definition?). Relying on philosophers’ use of the term, I first answer the descriptive question negatively: speciesism is a purely descriptive concept. Then, based on both its main functions in the philosophical and public debates and an analogy with racism, I answer the normative question negatively: speciesism should remain a purely descriptive concept. If I am correct, then speciesism neither is nor should be wrong by definition.
    
    
16. Jaquet, F. (2018). “Evolution and Utilitarianism”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(5), 1151-1161.
    Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he adds that utilitarian beliefs about wellbeing—e.g. the belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad—were probably shaped by evolution. Logically, de Lazari-Radek and Singer should therefore reject these beliefs along with the deontological beliefs that evolved. The present paper is a defense of their argument. After considering a number of unsuccessful replies to Kahane’s objection, I put forward a more promising solution: de Lazari-Radek and Singer should combine their objectivist view in metaethics with a subjectivist account of well-being, such as the desire theory. Such a hybrid account would tackle Kahane’s challenge because subjective accounts of value are immune from evolutionary debunking arguments. And it would be compatible with utilitarianism, which (as Kahane remarks) doesn’t fit very well with metaethical subjectivism. Before concluding, I deal with two concerns that this solution might raise: I argue that the desire theory is actually subjective enough to escape Kahane’s objection, and I deny that retreating to the combination of ethical objectivism and prudential subjectivism is ad hoc.
    
    
17. Cova, F. et al. (2018). “Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12, 9-44. (Open access)
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
    
    
18. Jaquet, F. & Martin, A. (2018). “La question animale: Une perspective pluridisciplinaire (introduction)”, Ethica, 22(1). (Open access)
    Introduction à un numéro spécial consacré à l'éthique animale.
    
    
19. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2017). “Les intuitions utilitaristes sont-elles vraiment utilitaristes?”, Raison publique, 22(2), 103-115.
    Article paru dans un numéro spécial hommage à Ruwen Ogien.
    
    
20. Jaquet, F. & Naar, H. (2016). “Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(1), 193-207.​ (Open access)
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. (According to a fourth theory, ‘substitutionism’, we should modify the content of our moral claims in such a way that they become true.) Putting abolitionism (and substitutionism) aside, our aim is to assess the plausibility of conservationism as an alternative to the – relatively dominant – fictionalism that we find in the literature. Given the difficulty of finding a conservationist view that is both (i) plausible and (ii) not merely a terminological variant of fictionalism, we will argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts.
    
    
21. Jaquet, F. (2015). “Les conséquentialistes ne sont pas (des psychopathes)”, Implications philosophiques.
    According to recent research in moral psychology the disposition to form consequentialist moral judgments is positively correlated to the degree of psychopathy: the more consequentialist you are, the more psychopathic tendencies you have. This claim rests on the assumption that consequentialism is a character trait. In this paper, I reject both the claim itself and this assumption on the basis of a study I ran in collaboration with Florian Cova.
    
    
22. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2015). “Ethique empirique et expérimentale (introduction)”, Implications philosophiques.
    Introduction à un numéro spécial consacré à l'éthique expérimentale.

Chapters in edited volumes
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1. Jaquet, F. (2024). “Speciesism”, in Y. Athanassakis, R. Larue, & W. O’Donohue (eds.), The Plant-Based and Vegan Handbook: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Springer.
   This chapter addresses three questions about speciesism. In response to the question “What is speciesism?”, I define speciesism as discrimination based on species. I then give a positive answer to the question “Does speciesism exist?”. In fact, many people discriminate against individuals based on their species. Finally, I address the question “Is speciesism fair or unfair?” Like racism and sexism, speciesism is wrong because it violates the principle of equal treatment, which requires us to treat individuals equally well absent a morally relevant difference.
   
   
2. Jaquet, F. (2024). "Moral Fictionalism and Misleading Analogies", in R. Joyce & S. Brock (eds.), Moral Fictionalism and Religious Fictionalism, Oxford University Press. (Open access)
   In a central variant, moral fictionalism is the view that we should replace moral belief with make-believe, that is, be disposed to accept some moral propositions in everyday contexts and to reject all such propositions in more critical circumstances. It is said by its opponents to face three significant problems: in contrast with a real morality, a fictional morality would not allow for deductive inferences; moral make-believe would lack the motivational force that is typical of moral belief; and moral make-believers could not genuinely disagree with one another about ethical matters nor, consequently, articulate their practical conflicts in moral terms. This chapter argues that all three objections rest on a misconception of the kind of attitudes recommended by fictionalism. Once misleading analogies are dismissed and the nature of moral make-believe is clarified, it becomes clear that a fictional morality would preserve deductive inference, moral motivation, and ethical disagreement.
   
   
3. Jaquet, F. (2023). "Against Moorean Defenses of Speciesism", in H. Viciana, A. Gaitán, & F. Aguiar (eds.), Experiments in Moral and Political Philosophy, Routledge. (Open access)
   Common sense has it that animals matter considerably less than humans; the welfare and suffering of a cow, a chicken or a fish are important but not as much as the welfare and suffering of a human being. Most animal ethicists reject this “speciesist” view as mere prejudice. In their opinion, there is no difference between humans and other animals that could justify such unequal consideration. In the opposite camp, advocates of speciesism have long tried to identify a difference that would fit the bill, but they have consistently seemed to fail. In light of this, some naturally began to appeal to Moorean arguments: the case against speciesism must be flawed somehow, these philosophers maintain, because speciesism is supported by a strong and widespread intuition. This chapter draws on recent findings in social psychology to criticize this defence of speciesism. It argues that the strong and widespread intuition that humans count more than animals is epistemically defective because it is causally shaped by a pair of irrelevant influences: cognitive dissonance and tribalism. Accordingly, it is no suitable basis for a Moorean argument.
   
   
4. Jaquet, F. (2023). "What If They Were Humans? Non-Ideal Theory in the Shelter", in V. Giroux, A. Pepper, & K. Voigt (eds.), The Ethics of Animal Shelters, Oxford University Press. (Open access)
   Our societies are marked by anthropocentrism: most people treat animals in ways in which they would by no means treat fellow humans. One might nonetheless expect this prejudice to be much less prevalent in animal shelters since these places are created for the very sake of non-humans and generally managed by people who truly care about animal welfare. This chapter questions this expectation. It discusses three practices that are widespread in animal shelters and yet could be suspected of anthropocentrism: killing animals for lack of resources, partnering with the livestock industry, and feeding animals meat. Drawing on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, the chapter argues that management euthanasia and cooperation with animal agriculture are acceptable in non-ideal theory even though they would be condemned by ideal theory. Then it argues that meat-based pet food should be rejected even in the non-ideal circumstances faced by animal shelters.
   
   
5. Giroux, V. et al. (2023). "The Ethics of Animal Shelters: Guidelines and Recommendations", in V. Giroux, A. Pepper, & K. Voigt (eds.), The Ethics of Animal Shelters, Oxford University Press.
   
   
6. Jaquet, F. (2020). “Le Spécisme”, in R. Larue (ed.), La pensée végane: 50 regards sur la condition animale. Paris: PUF.
   Ce chapitre aborde trois questions au sujet du spécisme. En réponse à la question « Qu’est-ce que le spécisme ? », je définis le spécisme comme une discrimination en fonction de l'espèce. Je réponds ensuite par l'affirmative à la question « Le spécisme existe-t- il ? ». Dans les faits, beaucoup de gens discriminent les individus en fonction de leur espèce. Enfin, je traite la question « Le spécisme est-il juste ou injuste ? ». À l'instar du racisme et du sexisme, le spécisme est injuste parce qu'il enfreint le principe d'égal traitement, qui nous demande de traiter les cas semblables de manière identique.
   
   
7. Jaquet, F. & Cova, F. (2019). “Internalisme et externalisme: Le problème de la motivation morale”, in O. Desmons, S. Lemaire, & P. Turmel (eds.), Manuel de métaéthique. Paris: Herman. (Open access)
   L'internalisme motivationnel est la théorie selon laquelle il existe une connexion nécessaire entre les jugements moraux et la motivation. Dans ce chapitre, nous distinguons un certain nombre de ses variantes et écartons celles d’entre elles qui sont moins directement intéressantes pour les grands débats métaéthiques. Nous examinons ensuite trois arguments philosophiques qui échouent à établir ou à réfuter l'internalisme. Enfin, nous présentons quelques arguments empiriques, relevant respectivement de la psychologie, des neurosciences et de la philosophie expérimentale.
   
   
8. Jaquet, F. & Cova, F. (2018). “Of Hosts and Men: Westworld and Speciesism”, in J. South & K. Engels (eds.), Westworld and Philosophy. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. (Open access)
   People's attitude to animals is similar to the attitude Westworld has people adopt vis‐a‐vis the hosts: People often deem animal suffering acceptable because it improves their well‐being but still feel upset when an animal is mistreated just for the sake of it. Speciesism is the view that human well‐being matters more than that of other creatures. One justification for this view attempts to ground human beings’ special moral status in their membership in the human species itself. Some of Westworld's characters are visibly tempted by this kind of justification. Logan is a prime example. One common argument in defense of speciesism is that non‐human animals are far less intelligent than human beings. Westworld's characters have interesting discussions about free will. In Westworld, all dialogues about free will focus on whether the hosts are determined or whether they could act otherwise.
   
   
9. Jaquet, F. (2018). “L’Impartialité”, in E. Tieffenbach & J. Deonna (eds.), Petit traité des valeurs. Paris: Ithaque. (Open access)
   Ce chapitre est consacré à l'impartialité conçue comme une propriété des jugements moraux. Un jugement est impartial, au sens pertinent, si et seulement si son auteur y souscrirait même s’il n’occupait pas la position qu’il occupe actuellement. Les jugements moraux se doivent d'être impartiaux en ce sens en vertu de leur universalisabilité, c'est-à-dire en vertu du fait qu'ils impliquent des jugements identiques pour tous les cas identiques quant à leurs propriétés universelles.
   
   
10. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2012). “Qu’est-ce que l’utilitarisme?”, in N. Journet (ed.), La morale : Ethique et sciences humaines. Paris: Editions Sciences Humaines.
    
    
11. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2012). “Conséquentialisme, déontologisme et vertus”, in N. Journet (ed.), La morale : Ethique et sciences humaines. Paris: Editions Sciences Humaines.

Encyclopedia entries
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1. Jaquet, F. (2019). “Spécisme (general audience version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   
2. Jaquet, F. (2018). “Spécisme (academic version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   
3. Jaquet, F. (2017). “Théorie de l’erreur (general audience version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   
4. Jaquet, F. (2016). “Théorie de l’erreur (academic version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   
5. Jaquet, F. (2016). “Utilitarisme (general audience version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   
6. Jaquet, F. (2016). “Utilitarisme (academic version)”, in M. Kristanek (ed.), Encyclopédie philosophique.
   
   

Special issues

1. Jaquet, F. & Martin, A. (2018). La question animale, Ethica, 22(1).
   
   
2. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2015). Ethique empirique et expérimentale, Implications philosophiques.

Book reviews

1. Jaquet, F. (2025). Playing Possum: How Animals Understand Death, by S. Monsó, Metascience, 34: 179–182. (Open access)
   
   
2. Jaquet, F. (2018). Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, by M. Arvan, Dialectica, 72(2): 315-320. (Open access)
   
   
3. Cova, F. & Jaquet, F. (2016). Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, by J. Greene, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 90, 248-252.

Translation
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• Nobis, N. & Grob, K. (2023). Penser l’avortement. Eliott Éditions. (Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should Be Legal. Open Philosophy Press, 2019.)